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THE INFORMATION QUALITY Acr AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: THE PERILS OF REFORM BY APPROPRIATIONS
RIDER
SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO*
Congress gave the White House new oversight powers in 2001 over
environment protection and other forms of regulation, but the significance of
this new authority went largely unnoticed at the time because the new legis-
lation was hidden in a few paragraphs of a very large appropriations bill.' The
legislation, now known at Information Quality Act ("IQA"), required the
Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"), to establish guidelines that
required each federal agency to establish procedures to ensure the "objec-
tivity, utility, and integrity of information... disseminated" by the federal
government. 2 The significance of this new authority has become more ap-
parent as OMB and the regulatory agencies have begun to implement the
legislation. In January 2002, OMB promulgated its guidelines instructing
agencies how to comply with the legislation.3 The Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"), after receiving public comment, promulgating procedures
* Rounds Professor of Law and Associate Dean, University of Kansas; Scholar, The Center
for Progressive Regulation. The author appreciates the comments and suggestions he
received from the other panelists and members of the audience at the symposium. The Center
for Progressive Regulation filed comments on OMB's proposed Information Quality
Guidelines and on proposed agency guidelines, and it has issued a "Perspective" on the
subject of this article. Although I either was the author of these documents or participated in
their drafting, this Article represents only the viewpoint of the author.
'Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No.
106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763A-125, 2763A-153 to 2763A-154 (2001).
2 Id. § 515(a), (b)(1); 114 Stat. at 2763A-153 to 2763A-154. The Act is known as both the
Data Quality Act and the Information Quality Act, though it has most recently been referred
to as the Information Quality Act by the Office of Management and Budget. See, e.g.,
Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54023, 54,026
(Sept. 15, 2003); Solicitation of Public Comments on Agency Information Quality Guidelines
for Ensuring Information Quality, 67 Fed. Reg. 38,690, 38,690 (June 5, 2002).
' Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of
Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8,452 (Feb. 22,
2002).
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to implement the legislation in October 2002,' as did other regulatory
agencies.5
This Article contends that IQA may turn out to be a useful good
government reform or a serious impediment to the protection of individuals
and the environment, depending on how the courts ultimately interpret its
terms. My argument proceeds in six steps. Part I describes the types of
information that the government disseminates, and indicates how these dis-
closures have a number of positive effects in terms of protecting individuals
and the environment. Part II describes IQA and OMB's interpretation of it.
Part III acknowledges that a process to vet information disseminated in
government reports and on the internet is appropriate, but it also explains
how the vague language used by Congress invites political and private actors
to interpret the rider in ways that may ossify the information disclosure
process. More specifically, Part Ill identifies several ways that IQA can be
interpreted to hinder the government's effort to protect people and the
environment through information disclosure. Parts IV and V offer a more
extended discussion of two additional potential adverse impacts. Part IV
discusses the assumption by OMB and agencies that IQA applies to the
rulemaking process, and contemplates how this application is likely to add to
the ossification of rulemaking. This Part argues that a better reading of the
legislation is that it does not apply to rulemaking. Part V discusses the extent
to which Congress intended that there be judicial review of agency decisions
regarding information quality complaints. It identifies arguments that both
preclude judicial review and limit the extent of such review. The potential
adverse impact of IQA on information disclosure that protects the public and
the environment will depend on the extent to which judicial review is avail-
able.
Finally, Part VI concludes that IQA demonstrates the perils of reform by
the appropriations rider. Because Congress failed to define the scope of the
rider, it has invited special interests to seek interpretations that inhibit the
" Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of
Information Disseminated by the Environmental Protection Agency, 67 Fed. Reg. 63,657
(Oct. 15, 2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/oei/qualityguidelines/ EPA-OEI-IQG-
FINAL-10.2.pdf.
'See, e.g., Department of Commerce, Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality,
Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Disseminated Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 62,685 (Oct.
8, 2002); Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and
Integrity of Information Disseminated by the Department of Labor, 67 Fed. Reg. 61,669
(Oct. 1, 2002).
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government's ability to protect individuals and the environment. The courts
have good reasons to reject these interpretations, and if they do so, IQA will
turn out to be a good government reform. If, however, Congress had resisted
the temptation to undertake reform by appropriations rider, it could have
avoided the time and effort that will be necessary to clarify the scope of the
Act.
I. INFORMATION AND REGULATION
The dissemination of information is now part and parcel of the regula-
tory process. While agencies have always provided information to the public
as part of the implementation of their statutory missions, the nature and
extent of such disclosures have changed over the last decade or so. This Part
describes the types of information disclosed by the government and the bene-
fits to the government of information disclosure.
A. Types of Disclosure
Some information disclosed by government is objective, factual
information generated by private parties or by the government itself.6 The
Toxic Release Inventory ("TRI"), established by the 1986 Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act,7 is perhaps the best example
of the disclosure of factual information generated by private parties! TRI is
an annual, national compilation of chemical releases issued by EPA.9 The dis-
semination by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA")
of company-specific inspection and enforcement data is a good illustration
of the second category of factual information.'"
6See James W. Conrad, Jr., The Information Quality Act-Antiregulatory Costs of Mythic
Proportions?, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 521,529 (2003) (suggesting examples in the text
used as illustrations).
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (2000). TRI is specifically established by 42 U.S.C. § 11023
12000).
Conrad, supra note 6, at 528.
9 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2000); see Envtl. Prot. Agency, Toxic Release Inventory (TRI)
Program, at http://www.epa.gov/tri/ (last updated Nov. 5, 2003) (providing access to
chemical releases information by zip code).
'0 Occupational Safety & Health Admin., Dep't of Labor, Establishment Search, at
http://www.osha.gov/cgi-bin/est/estl (last visited Dec. 10, 2003) (allowing for searching of
OSHA enforcement inspections).
3412004]
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Other information disseminated by the government results from testing
and evaluation done by agencies or for agencies."1 EPA, for example, pub-
lishes test results indicating the gas mileage of new automobiles,' 2 and the
Department of Transportation ("DOT") informs the public about the results
of test rating the crash-worthiness of vehicles.1 3 EPA assesses the risks posed
by certain substances in its Integrated Risk Information System ("IRIS").14
The Department of Health and Human Services' National Toxicology
Program's Report on Carcinogens, as its name indicates, identifies substances
that are potential carcinogens. ' 5 EPA's Index of Watershed Indicators informs
the public about state water quality information, 6 and its Risk Screening
Environmental Indicators Model ranks the health risks of toxic chemical
releases according to the seriousness of the health risk and the number of
persons exposed to the risk.'7 In addition, EPA recently created "Science
Inventory," a searchable Agency-wide database of the Agency's scientific and
technical work products (for example, risk assessments, technical studies and
guidance, and research).' 8
B. Benefits of Information Disclosure
The disclosure of information by agencies can have a number ofpositive
effects. First, if individuals are more knowledgeable about some types of
potential risks to themselves, they may be able to take protective actions.
Consumers, for example, can use the crash data disseminated by DOT to
purchase automobiles that have a higher crash rating. 19 Similarly, OSHA may
: Conrad, supra note 6, at 528.
'
2 See DEP'T OF ENERGY & ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PUB. No. DOE/EE-0271, MODEL YEAR
2003 FUEL ECONOMY GUIDE, http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/FEG2003.pdf (last visited
Dec. 10, 2003) (providing a searchable database of results of crash tests by automobile type
and brand).
"3 See Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., New Car Assessment Program, at
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/NCAP/Index.htil (last visited Dec. 10, 2003).
"' See Envtl. Prot. Agency, Integrated Risk Information System, at http://www.epa.gov/iris
(last updated Aug. 13, 2003) (providing access to IRIS).
' See NAT'L TOxICOLOGY PROGRAM, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT ON
CARCINOGENS (10th ed. 2002), available at http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/roc/toc I 0.html.
6 See Envtl. Prot. Agency, Index of Watershed Indicators: National Maps, available at
http://www.epa.gov/wateratlas/geo/maplist.html (last updated July 31, 2002).
"' See Envtl. Prot. Agency, Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators Version 2.1 (July
2003), at http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/rsei/docs/factsheet v2-I.pdf.
"s See Envtl. Prot. Agency, Science Inventory, at http://cfpub.epa.gov/si/ (last visited Dec.
19, 2003).
"9 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
342 [Vol. 28:339
THE INFORMATION QUALITY ACT
"prompt greater worker protection by publishing [workplace] risk and abate-
ment information," because, armed with such information, some workers may
be able to bargain for more protection."0
Consumers can also use information disseminated by federal agencies
to take actions that may lead to greater protection of the environment or other
regulatory goals. First, consumers may use information to favor companies
with good environmental records or to refuse the buy the products of
companies with poor records, either individually or as part of consumer boy-
cotts. 21 In addition, political activists can use information about environ-
mental performance to engage in actions that reduce environmental risks,
such as negotiating directly with polluters.2 In order to head off adverse
consumer or political action, companies may take additional actions to
protect individuals and the environment.23 There is evidence, for example,
that the Toxic Release Inventory has caused firms to improve their environ-
mental performance by reducing toxic exposures beyond the amounts
required by existing regulations.24 Some regulatory reformers believe that
information disclosure has a powerful enough impact on corporations that it
can serve as an alternative to regulation, 25 while other commentators, in-
cluding this author, see it as a useful supplement to rulemaking, but not a
replacement for it.26
The intemet greatly increased the potential for the positive effects.
Although the government previously disseminated information to the public
in the form of reports, bulletins, and other documents, the information was
often difficult to locate and obtain prior to the internet. All regulatory agen-
cies now have websites and the government has established one location-
http://www.firstgov.gov-that provides central access to all agency data-
bases.27
20 Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy Rabinowitz, Voluntary Regulatory Compliance in Theory and
Practice: The Case of OSHA, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 97, 140 (2000) (proposing such disclosure).
21 Id. at 113.
22 E. Donald Elliot, Environmental TQM: Anatomy of a Pollution Control Program That
Works!, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1840, 1852 (1994).2 3 See id. at 1851.
24id.
25 See, e.g., id. at 1849-51 (finding that corporations will voluntary reduce pollution in
response to incentives such as information disclosure).
26 See, e.g., Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 20, at 100-01 (expressing skepticism that
disclosure can replace traditional regulation).
2 See Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231,
110 Stat. 3048 (1996) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000)) (requiring federal agencies to
establish electronic reading rooms-i.e., websites--containing policy and guidance
2004] 343
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If regulation compels corporations to take preventative actions to protect
individuals and the environment without further regulatory action on the part
of EPA or other agencies, agencies can avoid rulemaking, which is now such
a burdensome process that it often takes years and years.28 Further, the
information also can be easily updated or supplemented, while changes in
regulations, by comparison, require a second round of notice and comment
rulemaking.
29
In addition, regulated entities may prefer information-based strategies
because these approaches do not mandate any specific method of achieving
that protection. For example, according to the reformers, TRI, unlike "con-
ventional regulatory rules, ... is not a costly, flexibility-impeding, externally
imposed constraint."3
In light of the government's increased reliance on information to inform
consumers and influence regulated entities, there has been increased em-
phasis on ensuring that the information disseminated by the government is
accurate and useful to the public.3' Poor quality information can lead con-
sumers to take actions that are unnecessary and inappropriate, and it can lead
citizens to take political and consumer actions that are unwarranted. When
agencies disseminate unreliable information, they also can unfairly damage
a corporation's reputation and adversely affect their own credibility. Ernie
Gellhorn pointed out the last disadvantage of erroneous information thirty
years ago,32 but the potential of the intemet to spread information heightens
the harm that can occur.
II. THE INFORMATION QUALITY ACT
The Information Quality Act is intended to promote the dissemination
by the government of reliable and accurate information.33 Unfortunately,
documents, and, most importantly, all documents that "the agency determines have become
or are likely to become the subject of subsequent requests," 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(D)).
" See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifing" the Rulemaking Process, 41
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1387-91 (1992) (documenting delays in rulemaking).
19 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
3 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRland Performance
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L. J. 257, 300 (2001).
31 See, e.g., Mark Greenwood, White Paper From Industry Coalition to EPA Over Concerns
Over Information Programs Submitted May 4, 1999, [1999] 85 Daily Env't (BNA), at E-1
(May 4, 1999) (raising concerns about the government dissemination of incorrect
information).
32 Ernest Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1380,
1426-27 (1973).
" See Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L.
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because it was passed as a brief appropriations rider, without the benefit of
hearings or debate, Congress gave limited guidance as to how this goal was
to be accomplished, and how it was to be balanced with the regulatory goals
of agencies. OMB plugged this gap by offering its own interpretation of what
Congress required. This section describes and analyzes the IQA and OMB's
interpretation of it.
A. The Rider
In light of its brevity, the easiest way to describe the IQA is to reprint it.
The IQA, amending the Paperwork Reduction Act, states in its entirety:
(a) In General.-The Director of the Office of Management
and Budget shall, by not later than September 30, 2001,
and with public and Federal agency involvement, issue
guidelines under sections 3504(d)(1) and 3516 of title
44, United States Code, that provide policy and
procedural guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and
maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity
of information (including statistical information)
disseminated by Federal agencies in fulfillment of the
purposes and provisions of chapter 35 of title 44, United
States Code, commonly referred to as the Paperwork
Reduction Act.
(b) Content of Guidelines.-The guidelines under sub-
section (a) shall-
(1) apply to the sharing by Federal agencies of, and access
to, information disseminated by Federal agencies; and
(2) require that each Federal agency to which the guidelines
apply-
(A) issue guidelines ensuring and maximizing the quality,
objectivity, utility, and integrity of information (in-
cluding statistical information) disseminated by the
agency, by not later than 1 year after the date of issuance
of the guidelines under subsection (a);
(B) establish administrative mechanisms allowing affected
No. 106-554, § 515(a), (b)(2)(A), 114 Stat. 2763A-125, 2763A-154 (2001).
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persons to seek and obtain correction of information
maintained and disseminated by the agency that does not
comply with the guidelines issued under subsection (a);
and
(C) report periodically to the Director-
(i) the number and nature of complaints received by the
agency regarding the accuracy of information
disseminated by the agency and;
(ii) how such complaints were handled by the agency.34
B. OMB Guidelines
The legislation requires OMB to establish "policy and procedural"
guidelines to ensure and "maximiz[e] the quality, objectivity, utility, and
",31integrity of information" that is "disseminated by Federal agencies ....
Congress did not define any of the previous terms nor is there any legislative
history that indicates what the scope of these terms might be. Because the
legislative rider is an empty vessel, OMB's definition of these terms is very
influential. Agencies are bound by OMB's definitions unless and until a court
determines that OMB's definitions misstate Congress' intent.36 Under
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 37' however,
courts will defer to an agency when Congress has failed to precisely define
statutory language, which means that OMB's definitions3 may prevail.
As noted, the legislation applies to all information that is "disseminated"
by an agency. OMB has defined "dissemination" of information to include
any "agency initiated or sponsored distribution of information to the pub-
lic."'39 An agency initiates or sponsors information any time that it endorses
the information in some manner.40 Thus, even if the source of information is
a non-government entity, the information falls within the scope of the
legislation so long as the government uses it in a manner that indicates the
34 Id. § 515, 114 Stat. at 2763A-153 to 2763A-154.
35 Id. § 515(a), 114 Stat. at 2763A-154.
36 Id. § 515(b)(2), 114 Stat. at 2763A-154.
3 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
31 Id. at 844-45.
3' Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of
Information Dissemination by Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8,452, 8,460
(Feb. 22, 2002).40 Id. at 8,453-54.
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agency's endorsement of the information. Under OMB's definition, an
agency would therefore "disseminate" information when it places information
on its website or issues a memorandum or report addressing some policy
issue.
OMB's position is that an agency also "disseminates" information when
it issues information during rulemaking,4' and the agency guidelines reflect
this interpretation.42 This interpretation, however, is open to dispute, and Part
IV of this Article will argue that the legislation does not encompass rule-
making.
OMB subjected agencies to a three-tiered set of requirements 43 intended
to "maximize the quality, utility, objectivity and integrity" of disseminated
information." These requirements are summarized in Table I infra. The
requirements address both the manner in which an agency presents infor-
mation and the reliability of the information that the agency presents. All
information must, at a minimum, meet the criteria OMB has established for
routine information.45 In addition, agencies must meet additional require-
ments if information is "influential," which is information that "will have or
does have a clear and substantial impact on important public policies or
important private sector decisions." '46 Finally, there is an additional require-
ment concerning information about environmental, health, or safety risks.47
' Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of
Information Dissemination by Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8,457.
42 See, e.g., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR ENSURING AND MAXIMIZING THE
QUALITY, OBJECTIVITY, UTILITY, AND INTEGRITY OF INFORMATION DISSEMINATED BY THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 32 (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/oei/
41ualityguidelines/EPA-OEI-IQG-FINAL- 10.2.pdf.
See generally Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility,
and Integrity ofInformation Disseminationby Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg.
at 8,458-59.
"id. at 8,452.
45 Id. at 8,452-53, 8,458 § III(1).
46Id. at 8,460 § V(9) ("Each agency is authorized to define 'influential' in ways appropriate
for it given the nature and multiplicity of issues for which the agency is responsible.").
47 Id. at 8,460 § V(3)(b)(ii)(C).
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Table 1: OMB Information Quality Requirements
Type Presentation Reliability
Routine Clear and unbiased manner Presumed to be of sufficient
with contextual information if quality if subject to independent
necessary peer review
Influential High degree of transparency "Sound" statistic and research
methods required
Risk Adapt or adopt Safe Drinking Adapt or adopt Safe Drinking
Water Act Amendments of Water Act Amendments of
1996 1996
Agencies are required to present all information in a clear and "unbiased
manner," including the presentation of other contextual information if it is
necessary to ensure a lack of bias.4" In addition, an agency must present in-
fluential information with sufficient transparency to ensure that others can
reproduce the results.4 9 This requirement is only overridden by other com-
pelling interests, such as the necessity of protecting trade secrets, in which
case the agency is to apply "especially rigorous robustness checks" before
disseminating the information.5" Finally, as to risk information, the agency
must adopt or adapt the risk disclosure provisions contained in the Safe
Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 ("SDWAA").5'
Agencies are required to assure that all of the information that they
disseminate is of reliable quality.52 If the information has been the subject of
"independent, external peer review," there is a rebuttable presumption that it
meets this requirement.53 In addition, an agency cannot disseminate influ-
ential "scientific, financial, or statistical" information until it determines that
"analytical results" were "developed, using sound statistical and research
methods."54 If the agency is disseminating risk information, the information
must meet the requirements for risk information in SDWAA or some
adaptation of these principles."
48 Id. at 8,459 § V(3)(a).
49 Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of
Information Dissemination by Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8,459 §
V(3)(a).
0 Id. at 8,460 § V(3)(b)(ii)(B)(i)-(ii).
5, Id. at 8,460 § V(3)(b)(ii)(C).
52 Id. at 8,459 § V(3)(b)(i).
" Id. at 8,460 § V(3)(b).
54 Id. at 8,459 § V(3)(b)(ii)(C).
" Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of
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IQA further requires agencies to establish guidelines for the same
purpose as OMB and to establish "administrative mechanisms" that allow
"affected persons to seek and obtain correction of information maintained and
disseminated by the agency that does not comply with the [OMB] guidelines
. 56 OMB provides that such "mechanisms shall be flexible, appropriate
to the nature and timeliness of the disseminated information, and incor-
porated into agency information resources management and administrative
practices."57
III. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE OMB GUIDELINES
This Part begins the analysis of the impact of OMB's interpretation of
IQA. The guidelines raise three issues. First, to what extent is it likely that the
proposed procedures will improve the quality ofinformation disseminated by
the federal government? Second, to what extent will the proposed procedures
delay the dissemination of information to the public and impose additional
time and cost burdens on agencies? Third, in light of the previous potential
problems, do the benefits of the proposed procedures outweigh the costs that
they impose? This Part discusses a number of issues that relate to these
questions.
A. The "Sound Science" Campaign
In order to ensure that information is "objective," OMB requires
agencies to verify that information that is "scientific, financial, or statistical"
has been derived "using sound statistical and research methods."" Affected
persons are entitled to file a complaint that agency-disseminated information
information fails to meet this test.59 Thus, the legislation opens the door for
corporations or trade associations to challenge any scientific information that
an agency makes public on the internet or in a report. The legislation there-
Information Dissemination by Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8,460 §
V(3)(b)(ii)(C).56 Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No.
106-554, § 515(b)(2)(B), 114 Stat. 2763A-125, 2763A-154.
57 Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of
Information Dissemination by Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8,459 §
111(3).
5 Id. at 8,459 § V(3)(b).
59§ 515(b)(2)(B), 114 Stat. at 2763A-153.
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fore opens the door for industry to pursue its "sound science" campaign in the
context of information disclosure. 60
The "sound science" initiative argues that agency regulations, partic-
ularly health and environmental regulations, are based on weak science that
does not support the stringency of the regulatory actions that agencies take to
protect people and the environment.6' Often, however, this argument blurs the
distinction between incomplete information and poor quality information. A
study on the potential risk of a hazard may be extremely competent, but it
may not yield definitive information about the extent of the risk posed. In this
circumstance, there is a policy question about what protective actions the
government ought to take. Environmental laws and other health and safety
laws require EPA and other agencies to act to reduce such risks before
definitive information is available. As John Applegate noted, "[r]egulation
based on risk permits regulatory action based on ex ante collective danger
rather than expost individual injury, and also operates preventatively to avert
injury to the public as a whole. 62 In order to discredit this protective tilt,
industry attempts to convince the public that such preventative actions are not
based on "sound science."'63 What industry is attacking, however, is the policy
choice made by Congress that the country should not wait for definitive
information about a hazard before something is done about it.'
Consider, for example, an excellent study that establishes that height-
ened levels of lead in a person's blood have adverse health effects. The study,
however, may fail to establish the extent to which airborne lead is absorbed
in the bloodstream. The "sound science" campaign would describe the ab-
sence of knowledge about air-to-blood transfer rates to mean that the
scientific evidence about the risks to humans of lead in their blood is of poor
scientific quality. If the government fails to act to protect individuals from
airborne lead for this reason, it would "mark a huge shift in American
environmental policy, which since the 1970s has relied upon the principle
o See Thomas 0. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 7, 17 (1998).
6I Id. at 17-18 (describing the "sound science" campaign).
62John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and
Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 261, 273 (1991).
63 Thomas 0. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, OSHA's Critics and Regulatory Reform, 31
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 587, 612-13 (1996) (explaining that the "sound science" campaign
objects not to the quality of data collected, but to regulations based on incomplete scientific
information and worst-case scenarios).64 Id.
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that we should base policy on the best available evidence."65 For example,
one of EPA's most successful efforts to protect the public was its decision in
1973 to phase out the use of leaded gasoline at a time when scientists did not
fully understand the air-to-blood transfer rate.66
The tilt in government regulation in favor of acting before we have
complete information about environmental risks does not mean that reg-
ulators should ignore how much we actually know about a hazard, but "it is
often wise to act before all the answers are in."'67 Otherwise, many people can
be harmed or the environment can be despoiled before the government acts.
Likewise, if information disclosure is to serve as a useful supplement to
regulation, administrators should take the quality of the evidence into
account, but it will often be good policy to disseminate the best available
evidence and not wait for more conclusive evidence to be discovered.
The risk for environmental and health and safety protection is that OMB
and agencies will administer IQA in a manner that makes information quality
"a goal in and of itself, rather than a means to ensure the most effective
protection of individuals and the environment under existing circum-
stances. ''68 If this happens, IQA will turn out to hinder the government's
legitimate efforts to protect people and the environment. If, by comparison,
OMB recognizes the "sound science" campaign for what it is-an attempt to
discredit the policies adopted by Congress to protect people and the
environment-then IQA is more likely to be a "good government" statute.
B. Peer Review
In its IQA guidelines, OMB discussed a potential role for peer review
of information. The guidelines require the use of "sound statistical and
research methods" regarding "scientific, financial, or statistical" infor-
mation. 6" OMB indicated, however, that it would presume that information
met this test if it had been subjected to "formal, independent, external peer
6 Ctr. for Progressive Regulation, The Data Quality Appropriations Rider: New Procedures
and Information Disclosure, para. 4, at http://www.progressiveregulation.org/perspectives/
dataQuality.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2003).
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at para. 5.
69 Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of
Information Dissemination by Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8,452, 8,459,
§ V(3)(b) (Feb. 22, 2002).
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review.... "70 In fall 2003, OMB proposed a bulletin that would supplement
the procedures announced in the IQA guidelines by requiring peer review of
most types of regulatory information not previously subjected to peer review
and by specifying the procedures under which that review would take place. 1
Since I have explored this proposal in some detail in another article, 2 I will
focus here on the general relationship between peer review and the likelihood
that IQA will end up ossifying the dissemination of government information.
The proposed bulletin requires that agencies conduct "appropriate and
scientifically-rigorous peer review ... on all significant regulatory informa-
tion that [is] ... disseminate[d]," and it defines "significant information" as
information that meets the "'influential test' in OMB's Information-Quality
Guidelines."73 Those guidelines define "influential" information as "informa-
tion [that] will have or does have a clear and substantial impact on important
public policies or important private sector decisions."'74 For "significant"
information, agencies can vary the type and extent of peer review depending
on the nature of the information being reviewed." OMB, however, mandates
specific peer review procedures for "[e]specially [s]ignificant [r]egulatory
[i]nformation.' 6 The proposed bulletin defines especially "significant
regulatory information" as information that supports a "major regulatory
action," "has a possible impact of $100 million" or more a year, or it
determined by OMB "to be of significant interagency interest or relevant to
an Administration policy priority."" For this category of information, an
agency must, among other procedures, choose independent and unbiased
scientists to provide the peer review, "provide. . . an explicit, written charge
... describing the purpose and scope of review," provide an opportunity for
the public to comment, require peer reviewers issue a final written report, and
respond to the final report indicating where the agency agrees and disagrees
with the peer review.' 8
70 Id. at 8,459, § V(3)(b)(i).
71 See Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,023 (Sept.
15, 2003).
72 Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB's Dubious Peer Review Procedures, [2004] 34 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,064 (Jan. 2004).
' Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. at 54,027.74 Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of
Information Dissemination by Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8,460.
7- Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. at 54,027, § 2.
76 Id. at 54,027-28, § 3.
77 Id. at 54,026.
78 Id. at 54,027-28.
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OMB's proposal would subject a significant amount of government
information to peer review. Much of the information that the government
disseminates is likely to have a "substantial" impact on "important public
policies or private sector initiatives."79 The category of "especially sig-
nificant" information is narrower, but OMB has left itself a couple of
loopholes that would permit it to greatly expand this category of information.
OMB will determine whether information be of "significant interagency
interest" or "relevant to an Administration policy priority," both ambiguous
concepts.80
The problem with this approach is that OMB ignores whether peer
review is necessary or is likely to identify problems with the information
being reviewed. Information may have a significant impact on public policy
or private sector initiatives, but "it does not follow that the information is
likely to be unreliable or that peer review is necessary to ensure its
objectivity."'" OMB does permit an agency to vary the extent and nature of
peer review of "significant" information, which will reduce an agency's time
and expense of undertaking peer review. Nevertheless, there is likely to be a
considerable cost to the government. Although OMB's flexibility may reduce
the time and burden of individual reviews of significant information, the
collective cost of reviewing this information is likely to be great because the
government disseminates so much of this type of information. The burden on
an agency will be substantially greater for "especially significant regulatory
information" since OMB mandates expensive and time consuming pro-
cedures that agencies must use.
By ignoring the need for peer review, OMB is likely to ossify the infor-
mation dissemination process without producing offsetting benefits. OMB
would strike a more appropriate balance between the benefits and costs of
peer review if it "limit[ed] peer review to [instances] where the in-formation
[being reviewed] ... sets a new precedent or is reasonably controvertible." 2
Peer review has a role to play in the implementation of IQA, but OMB's
failure to limit peer review to situations where it is most likely to be useful
suggests that IQA is more likely to hinder government than to help it. This
criticism is based on OMB's proposed peer review guidelines, and the final
" See supra note 74 and accompanying text (proposing peer review for information that has
a "substantial" impact).
:o See supra note 77 and accompanying text (defining "especially significant" information).
s' Shapiro, supra note 72, at 10,066.
82 Id.
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guidelines may restrict peer review in the manner recommended here. If so,
IQA is more likely to turn out to be a good government statute.
C. Risk Information
An agency's dissemination of risk information to the public may also
be hampered depending on how IQA is interpreted. The problem concerns
OMB's requirement that agencies "adopt or adapt" the risk principles in the
SWDAA of 1966.83
IQA requires agencies to maximize the "objectivity" of information.84
The OMB guidelines defines the "objectivity" of information as information
that is "accurate, reliable, and unbiased."85 Scientific, financial or statistical
information is "accurate, reliable, and unbiased" when it is produced by
"sound statistical and research methods. 8 6 If scientific information relates to
the analysis of risks to human health, safety and the environment, an agency
must meet the previous test by "adopt[ing]" or "adapt[ing]" the quality
principles applied by Congress to risk information used and disseminated
pursuant to SDWAA.8 7 Although EPA adopted SDWAA principles, 8 this
still may result in the inappropriate use of these principles. The danger is that
EPA's efforts to blend SDWAA principles with the approach mandated by
another statute may skew the end-result towards SDWAA principles and
away from Congress' mandate.
SDWAA sets out standards for the scientific evidence on which EPA
can rely in its regulation of water pollutants. The Act provides that "to the
degree that an Agency action is based on science" EPA "shall use... the best
available, peer-reviewed science and supporting studies conducted in accor-
dance with sound and objective scientific practices .... ."'9 Further, the Act
requires EPA to use "data collected by accepted methods or best available
methods (if the reliability of the method and the nature of the decision jus-
83 Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of
Information Dissemination by Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8,452, 8,460
§ V(3)(b)(ii)(C) (Feb. 22, 2002).
Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No.
106-554, § 515(a), 114 Stat. 2763A-125, 2763A-154 (2001).
85 Id. at 8,459, § V(3)(a).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 8,460 § V(3)(b)(ii)(C).
88 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 42, at 50.
89 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(3)(A) (2000).
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tifies use of the data)."90 Since SDWAA only applies to EPA's implemen-
tation of the Safe Drinking Water Act, these standards do not apply to other
actions by EPA or other agencies. Nevertheless, OMB claims that Congress
in SDWAA "adopted a basic standard of quality for the use of science in
agency decision-making,"'" but there is nothing in the text of SDWAA or the
legislative history to support this claim.
OMB's claim that the evidentiary standards in SDWAA apply outside
that context is also contradicted by the fact that Congress established
different, and less prescriptive evidentiary standards, in other environmental
and health and safety standards. Congress, for example, required OSHA to
use the "best available" scientific evidence in promulgating workplace
standards for toxic materials or harmful physical agents.92 In the Clean Air
Act, Congress required EPA to use the "latest scientific knowledge," as
reflected in air quality criteria documents, in setting the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards.93 Likewise, the Clean Water Act requires EPA recom-
mendations on science-based water quality criteria to be based on "latest
scientific knowledge," '94 and the Toxic Substances Control Act provides
general authority to develop testing protocols for evaluating risks from toxic
substances, but it does not embody the highly prescriptive risk assessment
principles announced in the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments.95 In other
statutes, the evidentiary standards for science-based decision-making are the
same as the substantive statutory standards. If, for example, a statute
mandates that EPA establish "margin of safety" in order to protect the public
health, it would not be ur'easonable for the agency to focus its attention on
upper-bound estimates of risk as a policy judgment.96
90 Id.
", Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of
Information Dissemination by Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8,452, 8,457
(Feb. 22, 2002).
92 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2000).
9342 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2) (2000). In fact, Whitman v. American Trucking Ass 'ns. rejected an
argument by industry litigants that the Clean Air Act requires a quantitative risk assessment
from EPA when EPA sets National Ambient Air Quality Standards under the Act. See 531
U.S. 457 (2001).
' 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (2000).
9' 15 U.S.C. § 2626(a) (2000).
' Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic 38 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for
Regulatory Studies, Working Paper 01-10, 2001), available athttp://www.aei-brookings.org
(suggesting congruence of risk assessment protocols and substantive standards).
2004]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
Given that other statutes set out different evidentiary standards, it would
be illegal for EPA or another agency to adopt the SDWAA principles in
another context. Moreover, in light of this discrepancy, it is not clear how
EPA or another agency can "adapt" the principles. In any case, EPA or anoth-
er agency would be violating its statutory obligations if its efforts to "adapt"
the SDWA principles led it away from the protective policies of the statutes
being administered.
Another provision of SDWAA concerns how risk information is
presented to the public. It requires EPA to "ensure that the presentation of
information on public health effects is comprehensive, informative, and
understandable." 97 Accordingly, EPA and other agencies are required, "to the
extent practicable," to make available to the public the following information:
(i) each population addressed by any estimate of public
health effects;
(ii) the expected risk or central estimate of risk for the
specific populations;
(iii) each appropriate upper-bound or lower-bound estimate
of risk;
(iv) each significant uncertainty identified in the process of
the assessment of public health effects and studies that
would assist in resolving the uncertainty; and
(v) peer-reviewed studies known to the Administrator that
support, are directly relevant to, or fail to support any
estimate of public health effects and the methodology
used to reconcile inconsistencies in the scientific data.98
Since this provision does not dictate an evidentiary standard, agency
compliance with it is not necessarily inconsistent with the implementation of
statutes other than the SDWAA. Moreover, agencies should make the
scientific information about risks as transparent as possible for the public.
There is one aspect of the previous requirements, however, that is
problematic. Section (ii) requires EPA to disclose "the expected risk or
central estimate of risk for the specific populations. . . ."99 The problem is
that the uncertainties that confound most risk assessments make it impossible
9 42 U.S.C. §300g-l(b)(3)(B).
98 Id.
99 Id. § 300g-l(b)(3)(B)(ii).
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to come up with a "central estimate... ."" Moreover, this problem cannot
be solved by simply averaging the predictions of competing risk models in
order to derive such an estimate. As one risk assessor notes, calculating a
central estimate ofrisk is like "average[ing] the winning percentage of all Los
Angeles sports teams-basketball, football, hockey, and baseball-to derive
a central estimate of the likely success for an athlete playing in that city." ''
In order to be transparent, agencies should instead reveal the different
predictions provided by different risk models, and explain the differences in
a comprehensive way.02
OMB's requirement that agencies adapt or adopt the risk principles
contained in SDWAA could lead to substantial harm to the protection of
people and the environment if it causes agencies to weaken their commitment
to the protective tilt that Congress built into the environmental and safety and
health laws. There is no evidence that Congress intended IQA to change the
substantive mandate of any agency in this manner. None of the language of
the Act supports this conclusion. Moreover, since there is no legislative
history or debates concerning the Act, there is also no legislative history that
suggests this was Congress' intention. By comparison, the public would
benefit from a more transparent disclosure of risk information, such as that
suggested by SWDAA, 1°3 as long as agencies not attempt a central estimate
of risk when it would be inappropriate.
D. Administrative Appeals
The ultimate impact of IQA will also depend on how agencies and OMB
implement the requirement that agencies "establish administrative mech-
anisms allowing affected persons to seek and obtain correction of information
maintained and disseminated by the agency that does not comply with the
guidelines [pursuant to the Act] ."104 OMB's guidelines interpret this
1ooMcGarity, supra note 60, at 28.
Itd. at 28 (quoting Elle Silbergeld's testimony before the House Subcomm. on Health and
Environment and the Subconmm. on Commerce, Trade and Hazardous Materials of the House
Comm. on Commerce in 1995).
'o
2 See Comment from Thomas 0. McGarity, President, Ctr. For Progressive Regulation, to
Envtl. Prot. Agency, Docket ID No. OEI-10014, at 16-17 (May 31, 2002), at
http://www.epa.gov/oei/qualityguidelines/dockets/ivbl 105-053102-mcgarrity.pdf(taking the
same position).1'3 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
" Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No.
106-554, § 515(b)(2)(B), 114 Stat. 2763A-125, 2763A-154 (2001).
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provision to require each agency to establish procedures that permit "affected
persons to seek and obtain, where appropriate, timely correction of infor-
mation maintained and disseminated by the agency that does not comply with
OMB or agency guidelines."' 5 The guidelines provide further that these
"mechanisms shall be flexible, appropriate to the nature and timeliness of the
disseminated information, and incorporated into agency information re-
sources management and administrative practices.' ' 6
Sensibly implemented, the previous requirements give the public the
opportunity to bring questionable information to the attention of an agency
and permit the agency to make appropriate corrections. Nevertheless, this
aspect ofIQA may turn out to hinder protection of the public and the environ-
ment in two ways. First, there is the potential that administrative appeals will
become part of the litigation strategy of regulated entities to slow, or even
stop, the government from disseminating information that is legally or po-
litically inconvenient for them. If agencies cannot respond expeditiously to
these efforts, they may have their intended effect. Second, the resolution of
information quality complaints should be transparent. If OMB and agencies
are not accountable to the public for these actions, there is the potential for
regulated entities to use IQA in ways that limit the protection of people and
the environment.
1. Ossification of Information Disclosure
IQA opens the door for entities opposing the release of government
information to use the appeals process to attempt to frustrate the dissem-
ination of information that may alert the public about risks to them or to the
environment. The extent to which the administrative mechanism will become
a burden on agencies depends on the number of complaints that they will
receive, how easily meritless complaints can be dismissed, and whether the
agencies have adequate resources to process the complaints without diverting
time and attention away from other regulatory and information activities.
There is insufficient evidence to date to determine the number of com-
plaints that agencies will have to resolve. Although some agencies publish
Information Quality Act complaints on their websites, most agencies have
105 Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity
of Information Dissemination by Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8,452,
8,459, § 111(3) (Feb. 22, 2002).
106 Id.
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apparently not yet done so. EPA is one of the agencies that does publish its
complaints. In the first year after EPA's guidelines became effective, for
example, EPA received fifteen information quality complaints.'° 7 By com-
parison, the Department of Transportation received forty-four complaints in.
just the first three months after its guidelines were published.'
Some of the complaints that have been filed certainly suggest that
agencies will have to cope with complaints filed for strategic purposes. The
Competitive Enterprise Institute ("CEI"), for example, filed complaints with
EPA,'0 9 the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 10 and the
Office of Science and Technology Policy..' requesting the agencies to with-
draw the National Assessment on Climate Change ("NACC"), an interagency
government report on global warming." 2 CEI is an industry think tank "that
has received more than $1 million in donations since 1998 from . . .
Exxon."" 3 CEI filed the challenge even though the report it challenged was
subjected to numerous rounds of public comment and peer review prior to
being disseminated by the government. "4 In other words, although the report
... Envtl. Prot. Agency, Requests Submitted To EPA, at http://www.epa.gov/oei/quality
uidelines/af req_correction sub .htm (last updated Nov. 24, 2003).Dep't of Transp., Docket Management System, at http://dms.dot.gov/cfreports/data
Q, uality run.cfin (last updated Dec. 10, 2003).
Letter from Christopher C. Homer, Compettive Enterprise Inst., to Office of Envtl. Info,
Envtl. Prot. Agency, Request for Response to/Renewal of Federal Data Quality Act Petition
Against Further Dissemination of 'Climate Action Report 2002' ("RFC") (Feb. 10, 2003),
at http://www.epa.gov/oei/qualityguidelines/afreqcorrectionsub/7428.pdf.
"o Letter from Christopher C. Homer, Competitive Enterprise Inst., to Nat'l Oceanic &
Atmospheric Admin. Section 515 Officer, Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Request
for Correction of Information: Petition to Cease Dissemination of the National Assessment
on Climate Change, Pursuant to the Federal Data Quality Act (Feb. 19, 2003), at
http://www.cei.org/pdf/3374.pdf.
... Letter from Christopher C. Homer, Competitive Enterprise Inst. to Dir. of the Office of
Sci. & Tech. Policy, Initial Request for Correction of Information: Petition to Cease
Dissemination of the National Assessment on Climate Change, Pursuant to the Federal Data
Quality Act (Feb. 20, 2003), at http://www.cei.org/pdf/3360.pdf.
12 NAT'L ASSESSMENT SYNTHESIS TEAM, US GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM,
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE UNITED STATES: THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES
OF CLIMATE VARIABILITY AND CHANGE (2000), at http://earth.usgcrp.gov/usgcrp/Library/
nationalassessment/ overview.htm.
"i' Paul Harris, Bush Covers Up Climate Research: White House Officials Play Down Its
Own Scientists' Evidence of Global Warming, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Sept. 21, 2003, at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0, 12271,1046388,00.html.
"a NATLASSESSMENT SYNTHESIS TEAM, supra note 112, at 3 (noting that "300 scientific and
technical experts... provided detailed comments" on drafts of the report, that hundreds of
public comments were received during a sixty-day comment period, and that "[a] panel of
distinguished experts convened by the President's Committee of Advisors on Science and
Technology . . . provided broad oversight, and monitored the authors response to all
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constituted the latest and best information about global warming according
to leading experts, CEI's complaint insisted that the report was not good
enough even to be disseminated to the public. After the agencies denied
CEI's request, it sued the government. 15 The suit was settled by CEI after the
government agreed to put a disclosure on the NACC that it had not been
reviewed according to the standards of IQA."16 CEI asserted in a press release
that the disclaimer established that the "the National Assessment is
propaganda, not science, ' '" 7 an assertion that is consistent with the sound
science campaign used by industry to attack scientific information used by the
government. As noted earlier, this campaign seeks to convince the public that
incomplete information is the same thing as poor quality information.ig
A complaint filed by Morgan, Lewis and Bockius with EPA is another
example of efforts to use IQA in a strategic manner. " 9 The complaint attacks
information in a 1986 publication, Guidancefor Preventing Asbestos Disease
Among Auto Mechanics, which warns mechanics to take preventative efforts
to prevent their exposure to asbestos contained in replacement brakes that
they install. 2 ' The firm said it was filing the complaint to challenge the docu-
ment because it was used by thousands of mechanics who had brought law-
suits after being exposed to asbestos in brakes.' 2' According to a news report,
"public health surveys indicate that thousands of auto workers are diagnosed
each year with asbestos-related diseases, such as mesothelioma, lung cancer
and asbestosis," and "[flew mechanics take protective measures when
working with brakes-mainly, they say, because they believe asbestos is no
longer present."' 22 As several members of Congress have pointed out, there
is new scientific information about the risks to mechanics, but none of this
information makes warnings in the book erroneous orjustifies its withdrawal:
reviews").
5 Press Release Competitive Enterprise Inst., White House Acknowledges Climate Report
Was not Subjected to Sound Science Law: CEI Drops Lawsuit Against Bush Administration
(Nov. 6, 2003), at http://www.cei.org/gencon/003,03740.cfrL16 Id.
7 Id. (quoting Myron Ebell, CEI Director of Global Warming Policy).
18 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
19 Letter from Dino Privitera, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, to Info. Quality Guidelines
Staff, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Request for Correction of Information (Aug. 19, 2003), at
http://www.epa.gov/oei/qualityguidelines/afreqcorrectionsub/ 2467.pdf.
2 Andrew Schneider, EPA Warning on Asbestos is Under Attack, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Oct. 25, 2003, available at http://www.stltoday.com/stltoday/news/stories.nsf/
News/8D5A91107334195086256DCA0054D4CA?OpenDocument&Headline=EPA+war
ning+on+asbestos+is+under+attack.
2 Id.; Privitera, supra note 119, at 8-9.
122 Schneider, supra note 120.
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In short, there is substantial evidence, which is ignored by
Morgan Lewis, indicating that considerable risks remain for
individuals that work with brake maintenance or manufacture.
While EPA could update the Guidance with this information,
it should by no means simply withdraw the Guidance. With-
drawing the Guidance without issuing new guidance would
create the misleading and dangerous impression that little or
no risk exists.'23
The filing of information complaints, such as the previous ones, indicate
that the IQA can be used by regulated entities, or their lawyers, to attack even
reliable information for strategic reasons. If this trend accelerates, the Act
could lead to the ossification of information disclosure. How burdensome
these complaints may become may turn on how easily corporations can sue
EPA and other agencies after they dismiss a compliant; an issue that is
discussed below.124 It will also depend on whether the White House and
Congress agree to give the agencies additional resources to process such
complaints. If not, agencies will either have to divert resources away from
other regulatory and information duties, or slow down the dissemination of
information in order to process the information complaints. In today's budget
climate, however, the likelihood of additional resources seems remote.
2. Accountability
In order to assure the accountability of the administrative appeals
process, agencies should notify the public about pending requests, permit
interested persons to file comments, and resolve the complaints in a
transparent manner. Although these procedures are important to assuring that
IQA is a good government statute, it is not yet certain that the public will
achieve this degree of participation and accountability.
First, as mentioned previously, agencies have been slow to put infor-
mation quality complaints on their websites. Without such notification, public
participation is likely to be stymied. The American Bar Association recom-
mended that "agencies should explore means to maximize the availability and
23 Letter from Representatives Henry Waxman, George Miller, John Tiemey, Major Owens
and Dennis Kurcinich, to Marianne Horinko, Acting Adm'r, Envtl. Prot. Agency (Oct. 20,
2003), at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ohl 0_kucinich/ 031020EPAasbestos.html.124 See infra Part V.
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searchability of existing law and policy on their websites,"'25 including
making available "all agencyrules and regulations, and all important policies,
interpretations, and other like matters on which members of the public are
likely to wish to rely ... ,,126
Second, OMB recently proposed that it must be notified of all infor-
mation quality complaints received by EPA and other agencies, and this
proposal would require an agency to consult with OMB prior to responding
to the complaint. 27 OMB, however, has not proposed any procedures that
would make this process transparent or that would make it accountable to the
public concerning how it influences an agency's decision regarding an
information quality complaint. Thus, OMB can order agencies to resolve a
complaint in a specific manner without acknowledging its participation in the
process. OMB can also intervene based on information and lobbying by
regulated entities or others that is unknown to the public or to the agency that
received the complaint.
Professor Glen 0. Robinson explained the importance of accountability
in presidential oversight when he noted that executive oversight is an
important form[] of policy influence and direction, . . . but
one should not suppose that, individually or collectively, these
interveners are simply representatives of the president. In fact,
these executive interveners are themselves part of the admin-
istrative bureaucracy and, as such, present the same type of
monitoring and control problems... as the agencies that they
seek to influence. 12
8
These same concerns would apply to OMB's efforts to influence or decide
how agencies resolve information quality complaints.
OMB's lack of accountability is particularly troubling in light of the
concerns raised in the previous section. Once regulated entities file strategic
information quality complaints, they will seek meetings with OMB to obtain
its support for their challenges. If the persons seeking OMB intervention are
'
2 5 Am. Bar Ass'n, Recommendation on Agency Web Pages 1 (Aug. 2001), at http://www.
abanet.org/adminlaw/federal02.pdf.I26 ld. at Report, 4.
127 Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,023, 54,029,
7 (Sept. 15, 2003).
28 GLEN O. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY: PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 102
(1991).
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politically valuable to the White House, it is possible that OMB will support
dubious information quality challenges. The likelihood of such a politically
motivated process is greater to the extent that OMB's invention occurs be-
hind a veil of secrecy.
OMB can make its participation more accountable and create a
transparent process by "issu[ing] a concise [public] explanation" when it
recommends how an agency should resolve a complaint. 129 It "should also
reveal for public disclosure any written communications, and a summary of
any oral communications" that it receives from members of Congress or
persons outside of the government concerning such complaints. 3 '
IV. RULEMAKING
IQA may lead to the dissemination of more accurate information by the
government, or it may needlessly bog down the dissemination of information
by agencies. The resolution of the issues identified in the last section will
determine which of these two possibilities will come to fruition. The fate of
IQA will also be determined by two additional issues that are taken up in the
next two Parts. This Part considers whether IQA applies to rulemaking, and
the next section considers whether there is judicial review of agency
resolution of information quality complaints.
IQA applies to all information that is "disseminated" by an agency, and
OMB has defined "dissemination" of information to include any "agency
initiated or sponsored distribution of information to the public."'' OMB
takes the position that IQA applies to information that an agency cites in a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking because an agency is endorsing the reliability
of that information.'32 The difficulty is that Congress failed to define the term
"dissemination." While the courts might defer to OMB's interpretation
because the statute is ambiguous,' there is a strong textual argument that
OMB's interpretation is clearly inconsistent with Congress' intent. Moreover,
this argument is supported by the legislative history of the Act, sparse as it is.
129 Shapiro, supra note 72, at 10,072.
130 id.
1'' Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity
ofInformation Disseminated by Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8,452, 8,460,
V(8) (Feb. 22, 2002).
2 See id. at 8,457 (creating an exemption for adjudication but not for rulemaking).
See supra note 37 and accompanying text (noting that courts defer to agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes under Chevron).
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The outcome of this issue will have an important impact on EPA's
ability to protect people and the environment. As discussed earlier, the
rulemaking process has become substantially ossified. 34 If IQA applies to
rulemaking, the process will become even slower. For one thing, agencies
would have an obligation to have information peer reviewed prior to its use
in rulemaking under OMB's proposed requirements for peer review.'35
Further, interested persons could file information act complaints regarding
the information in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, and OMB requires
agencies to respond to such complaints in certain circumstances before the
rulemaking is over.'36 Further, agencies will have to grapple with the issues
presented earlier as part of the rulemaking process, such as adopting SDWAA
principles to any risk information.' 3' Finally, the courts will have to sort out
how IQA and agency rulemaking are going to be reconciled, which will
embroil final rules in additional litigation.
The Supreme Court commonly interprets statutory terms according to
their common meaning. 3 ' According to the dictionary, disseminate means "to
spread or give out something, especially news, information, ideas, etc., to a
lot of people.' ' 139 This definition arguably includes the dissemination of
information in rulemaking, but it arguably does not as well. The definition
emphasizes that dissemination involves giving out information to "lots of
people."'40 This suggests that IQA applies only to agency efforts to bring
information to the attention of the public, which is not what takes place in
rulemaking. In rulemaking, people seek out the information, rather than the
agency trying to contact them and acquaint them with the information. By
comparison, according to this interpretation, dissemination involves agency
reports and putting information on the internet.
If the only evidence of Congress' intent was the common meaning of the
word "disseminate," the courts may well uphold OMB's interpretation of
IQA. But the structure of the statute strongly indicates that Congress did not
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text (discussing new obligations).
136 See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.C.
's See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 253 (2000) (discussing ordinary meaning cannons of statutory con-
struction).
"' See, e.g., CAMBRIDGE ADVANCED LEARNER'S DICTIONARY, at http://dictionary.cambridge.
org/.
140 Id.
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mean for the Act to apply to rulemaking. The Act requires each agency to
"establish administrative mechanisms allowing affected persons to seek and
obtain correction of information maintained and disseminated by the agency
that does not comply with the guidelines issued under [the Act] ....
Rulemaking, however, would be included in the common meaning of the
words "administrative mechanism." Why would Congress require each agen-
cy to "establish" an "administrative mechanism" to hear information quality
complaints when the rulemaking process already accomplishes this goal?
Why would Congress require each agency to "establish" an "administrative
mechanism" to hear information quality complaints when they already have
a perfectly good "administrative mechanism" to vet the quality of information
in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPR")? In other words, Congress
could not have meant IQA to apply to rulemaking because the requirement
that an agency establish an "administrative mechanism" to hear information
quality complaints is entirely superfluous or redundant.
Congress could not have meant that IQA apply to rulemaking for a
related reason. Not only is there already an "administrative process" to vet the
information used in rulemaking, information receives far more scrutiny in
rulemaking than it receives under IQA. Not only does the public have an
opportunity to comment on the information, but an agency's failure to justify
its rule in light of significant allegations that its data is not objective is
grounds for a judicial remand.142 As a result, agencies routinely respond to
comments regarding information quality, even if the agency does not think
that the comments are significant because a reviewing court might not agree.
There is additional support for the conclusion that IQA does not apply
to rulemaking when you consider that there was no "administrative mech-
anism" by which interested persons could challenge information contained
in reports or on the internet prior to IQA. Congress' requirement that agencies
establish an administrative mechanism obviously is responding to the lack of
such a process outside the context of rulemaking. Moreover, prior the
enactment of IQA, industry groups were complaining about the lack of a
process to challenge information in reports and on the internet, not in
"' Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No.
106-554, § 515(B)(2)(b), 114 Stat. 2763A-125, 2763A-154.
141 See Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response
to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REv. 525, 527 (1997) (explaining the encompassing
nature of hard look review).
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rulemaking. 43 Congress clearly was responding to these complaints. This
makes sense because there is little or no evidence that agencies rely on poor
quality information in promulgating rules.
OMB has partially conceded that a new administrative mechanism is
unnecessary to vet the information used in rulemaking. In a document issued
after its guidelines were finalized, OMB stated, "[w]here existing public
comment procedures-for rulemakings, adjudications, other agency actions
or information products-provide well-established procedural safeguards that
allow affected persons to contest information quality on a timely basis,
agencies may use those procedures to respond to information quality
complaints." 1" Perhaps because OMB recognizes that this concession raises
questions about whether IQA even applies to rulemaking, it interprets IQA
to require a separate administrative mechanism for information correct in a
limited context. OMB requires that agencies decide information quality com-
plaints about rulemaking information before the completion of the rule-
making process "where needed to avoid the potential for actual harm or
undue delay.' 14
5
It is highly unlikely that Congress meant to apply IQA to rulemaking in
order to protect complainants in the manner that OMB has established. First,
such a procedure is unnecessary because companies already have an oppor-
tunity to lobby the agency and object to information. Agencies are subject to
lobbying by interested parties long before there is a NPR. This is the purpose
of the Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, which informs interested persons
about rules under development in an agency. 6 Moreover, it seems highly
unlikely that a corporation will be unaware of the information used by an
agency to issue a NPR. Agencies normally rely on scientific evidence that has
143 See, e.g., Greenwood, supra note 31 (complaining about the quality of information
contained in reports and on the Web, but not rulemaking); see also Am. Bar Ass'n,
Recommendation and Report (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/
2001/1 07c.pdf (ABA resolution endorsing a correction process for information disseminated
in reports and on the internet).
'" Information Quality Guidelines-Principles and Model Language (Sept. 5, 2002), in
Memorandum from John D. Graham, Adm'r Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, for the
President's Management Council, Agency Final Information Guidelines (Sept. 5, 2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/pmcmemo.pdf.
145 Id. at 1.
146 See Executive Order 12,866, Regulatory Planning and Review, § 4(b), 58 Fed. Reg.
51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (requiring that agencies publish semiannual regulatory agendas
describing regulatory actions they are developing); Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §
602 (2000) (requiring that agencies publish semiannual regulatory agendas describing
regulatory actions they are developing).
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been published in the scientific literature, and interested corporations and
trade associations closely track these scientific developments. Second, OMB
reviews proposed significant agency rules before the agency issues a NPR
and therefore reviews the quality of information on which the agency is re-
lying. Interested parties have the opportunity to call OMB's attention to
alleged inaccuracies in the information on which an agency is relying. Third,
interested parties frequently have an additional opportunity to challenge
alleged inaccuracies in information during the public hearings held by
scientific advisory boards that agencies appoint to help them evaluate scien-
tific information and arguments. Indeed, since agencies routinely rely on such
committees regarding scientific information utilized in significant rules,
persons with an interest in the accuracy of such information receive the
protection of this form of peer review before it is used in a NPR. Finally,
permitting judicial review in the middle of an agency action is such a dra-
matic departure from normal administrative procedure that courts should be
wary of assuming that this was Congress' intention. As the Supreme Court
has said, the "expense and annoyance" of participating in the agency process
is "part of the social burden of living under government." '47
The structure and the scant legislative history of IQA both suggest that
Congress intended the Act to give interested parties the opportunity to
challenge information disseminated by the government in reports and on the
internet. It remains to be seen whether the courts will regard this evidence of
legislative intention as sufficiently definitive to overcome OMB's argument
that the common meaning of the word "disseminate" includes the distribution
of information in rulemaking. The outcome of this issue will have a
significant impact on the fate of IQA. If it does apply to rulemaking, it is
likely to further ossify the rulemaking process without producing offsetting
benefits. As argued, the rulemaking process is sufficient to vet information
and further such procedures are unnecessary.
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW
The final aspect of IQA that will impact agency dissemination of
information is the extent to which corporations and other entities can obtain
judicial review when EPA or another agency denies an information quality
147 Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 244 (1980) (quoting Petroleum
Exploration, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209, 222 (1938)).
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complaint. If agencies find themselves defending dozens of information
quality lawsuits, the dissemination of information to the public is likely to
shrink. Agency resources will be diverted to defense of lawsuits, which will
reduce resources that can be devoted to the dissemination of information.
Moreover, the agency will likely involve its lawyers in the vetting of infor-
mation in order to reduce such litigation, which will slow the dissemination
of information to the public. Finally, in order to avoid these costs, agencies
may simply reduce the amount of information that they disseminate.
The extent to which an agency's rejection of information quality
complaints will be subject to judicial review is difficult to predict for the
reasons explored in this section. Courts have previously refused to engage in
judicial review of agency dissemination of information on the ground that it
was not final agency action, which is a prerequisite for judicial review under
section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 4 8 By comparison,
the rejection of a complaint under IQA is probably final agency action, which
would make it possible for litigants to seek judicial review under section 702.
Nevertheless, the government has a good argument that judicial review is
precluded under APA section 701 because resolution of an information
quality complaint is committed to agency discretion by law. 49 If courts reject
this argument, the availability ofjudicial review will turn on whether plain-
tiffs have standing to seek judicial review of information quality complaints.
It appears that some plaintiffs may have standing to appeal such complaints
and others may not.
A. Cause of Action
In order to sue an agency, a litigant must have a cause of action, which
indicates that Congress has authorized the type of lawsuit that the litigant
seeks to file."5° IQA, however, does not authorize a lawsuit if an agency
rejected an information quality compliant. A person may be able to file an
action under APA section 702, which is a backstop provision that can provide
'48 See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000) (authorizing the courts to review "final agency action").
149 See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2000) (precluding judicial review of "agency action [that] is
committed to agency discretion by law").0 See WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE: PROBLEMS
AND CASES 404 (2d ed. 2001) (noting a cause of action gives a plaintiff a judicially
enforceable right).
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a cause of action when there is none in the agency's mandate. 5' Thus,
whether or not there is judicial review of agency compliance with the appro-
priations rider depends on whether there is a cause of action under APA.
According to section 702, any person "aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute" may seek judicial review of that
action. 52 A plaintiff satisfies this provision if the injury suffered by the
plaintiff as a result of agency action is "arguably within the zone of interests
to be protected ... by the statute .... 53 To make this determination, a court
"discerns the interests 'arguably . . . to be protected' by the statutory
provision" and then determines whether the plaintiff's interests "affected by
the agency action in question are among them .... ,154
Despite section 702, the courts have routinely refused to subject agency
information activities to judicial review under APA prior to the passage of
IQA. The reason was that section 704 limits judicial review under APA to
"final agency action,"' 55 and the courts concluded the issuance of reports or
the dissemination of information was not "agency action" as defined by APA.
APA defines "agency action" as "includ[ing] the whole or a part of an agency
rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or
failure to act .... ",, Since the release of information is not a "rule, order,
license, sanction, relief,. . or the failure to act," or anything equivalent to
these functions, the courts have long taken the view that information
disclosure is not agency action.'"
All of the functions listed in APA as "final agency action" have some
direct and immediate legal effect. Since reports and information disclosure
do not have such an impact, they are not the type of action to which APA
refers. In Industrial Safety Equipment Ass 'n v. EPA, for example, the court
held that the publication of a guide on respirators by the National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health was not final agency action despite the fact
the report allegedly had the impact of decertifying most of the respirators
'Id. at 404 (describing section 702 of the APA as a "fall-back" provision).
152 See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000).
'"Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 487 (1998)
(quoting Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970)).
I ld. at 492.
5 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000).
1565 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2000).
' See Hearst Radio v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 167 F.2d 225, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1948)
(denying review of information disclosure).
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currently for sale.'5 8 The court justified its decision in part on the ground that
a report did not impose mandatory requirements. 5 9 Similarly, the Fourth
Circuit refused to review an EPA report on second-hand smoke that Congress
ordered the agency to produce.' 60 It noted that because the statute barred the
agency from imposing "any" regulation, the report carried no legally binding
effect. 161
IQA could change the previous result because a litigant would not be
seeking review of an agency's dissemination of information, but rather the
agency's rejection of the litigant's information quality complaint. Unlike the
dissemination of information, the rejection of a complaint is arguably an
"order,"'62 which places the agency's action in rejecting the complaint within
the terms that APA defines as "final agency action." 163 That is, the agency
resolves a legal claim and this makes the decision subject to review as final
agency action.
B. Preclusion of Review
The resolution of information quality complaints appears to be final
agency action as the APA defines that term. Nevertheless, the availability of
judicial review under section 702 is subject to the condition in section 701
that prohibits judicial review when agency action is "committed to agency
discretion by law."' 64 According to judicial interpretation of section 701, a
matter is "committed to agency discretion by law" when a statute is "drawn
so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the
agency's exercise of discretion."1 6 In other words, there is no judicial review
according to section 701 when there is no law to apply.
IQA requires OMB and other agencies to "ensur[e] and maximiz[e] the
quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information ... [that is] dis-
seminated by Federal agencies,"1 66 but the legislation does not define any of
"
5
'See 837 F.2d 1115, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
'I9ld. at 1121.
" Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 313 F.3d 852,854
(4th Cir. 2002).61 Id. at 858.
162 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (2002).
"I Id. § 704.164 1d. § 701(a)(2).
165 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985).
' Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No.
106-554, § 515(a), 114 Stat. 2763A-125, 2763A-154 (2001).
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these terms, and there is no legislative history that indicates what the scope
of these terms might be. Congress' failure to define such terms strongly sug-
gests that it intended to leave the policing of IQA to OMB.
The statutory language of the Act can be read to support this inter-
pretation. It requires OMB to establish guidelines that establish a framework
for agency guidelines.'67 Second, it requires agencies to "report periodically
to the Director" concerning "the number and nature of complaints received
by the agency regarding the accuracy of information disseminated by the
agency" and concerning "how such complaints were handled by the
agency."' 68 In other words, Congress envisioned that OMB would establish
standards for agency guidelines and intended OMB to police agency
adherence to those guidelines through the report back provision.
Litigants seeking judicial review will argue that a court can use the
definitions established by OMB to effectuate judicial review. But to do so
would ignore that Congress failed entirely to define these terms, which is a
strong signal that it did not contemplate that IQA would create a private right
of action. Moreover, the fact that Congress assigned OMB the responsibility
for monitoring agency compliance with the legislation supports the
conclusion that no judicial review was intended. In light of Congress' failure
to define key terms, this delegation indicates that Congress expected that
OMB would define the terms and enforce compliance with its definitions.
C. Standing
Even if a court determines that a litigant has a cause of action, the
person or entity must also have standing to appeal the denial of an informa-
tion quality complaint. The requirement that a litigant have standing is
constitutional and arises because federal courts are restricted to deciding
cases and controversies.'69 In order to have standing, a litigant must demon-
strate that it has "suffered an 'injury in fact,"' there is a "causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of," and it is "'likely'... that
the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision. ' "'170 It is unclear the
extent to which persons seeking judicial review of information quality
complaints will be able to meet these requirements.
167 Id. § 515(a)(1)-(b)(2)(A), 114 Stat. at 2763A-154.
.6 Id. § 515 (b)(2)(C), 114 Stat. at 2763A-154.
169 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
17o Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citations omitted).
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The harm to a corporation of the release of information about risks to
humans or the environment is that other people may act on the basis of the
information in ways that are politically or financially disadvantageous to the
corporation.'71 If, for example, EPA releases information about the extent of
the risk posed by a chemical, access to this information may encourage
activists to engage in political action that seeks to pressure the corporation to
reduce its use of that chemical or find a less dangerous substitute. Alter-
natively, someone who believes he or she has been injured by exposure to the
chemical may seek legal redress.
While the Supreme Court has long recognized "economic harm" as an
injury that satisfied the "injury-in-fact" requirement,17 1 the plaintiff must
establish that its injury is "'actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypo-
thetical. ... ,,,17 The problem for plaintiffs claiming economic injury from
the agency's rejection of an information quality complaint is that the degree
of economic harm depends on the reaction of third parties to the agency's
refusal to adjust the information in the manner the plaintiff sought. For
example, a plaintiff would have to have sufficient proof that the agency's
decision would in fact lead to a loss of sales or a tort suit, using the previous
examples of harm. The degree of evidence that courts will require is un-
certain. As Professor Pierce demonstrates, the Supreme Court has granted
standing in some cases "based on causal relationships that are remote,
tenuous, and highly speculative,"'7 4 and "[t]he Court also has denied standing
in many cases where the challenged action seemed highly likely to cause the
alleged injury.', 175
Assuming that courts employed "a realistic assessment of the likely
consequences of agency action,"' 76 some plaintiffs may gain standing to
pursue judicial review of information quality complaints and some will not,
depending on the nature of the information at issue. For example, assume
EPA issues a report that a pesticide, manufactured by one company, is far
more harmful to individuals or the environment than was previously
understood. If EPA rejects an information quality complaint concerning that
171 See notes 21-22 and accompanying text (describing the potential for this reaction).
172 See 3 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 1122-25 (4th ed. 2002)
(discussing cases that recognize economic injury as grounds for standing).
73 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
174 3 PIERCE, supra note 172, at 1159.7 5 3 Id. at 1161.
176 See 3 id. at 1156 (noting in some cases the Court employs this standard).
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finding, the manufacturer of the pesticide may be able to establish that
consumers may switch to less dangerous alternatives or that the information
makes it more likely that the manufacturer will be subject to tort actions. In
other situations where EPA's dissemination of information is less news-
worthy, a corporation would have more difficulty proving that a sufficient
number of consumers or members of the public are likely to find out about
the information and that the company will suffer some type of injury. This
suggests that corporations may not gain standing concerning information
quality complaints that address routine agency information that is little
noticed except by regulated entities and perhaps environmental advocacy
groups. Companies should have difficulty gaining standing in another sit-
uation. Assume that EPA releases a report indicating that the dangers of
global warming are greater than previously understood. It is difficult to see
how companies that emit carbon dioxide can plausibly claim that the report
will lead to an adverse consumer reaction or that they are now more likely to
be sued.
In the last two examples, a corporation may seek standing on the ground
that the release of routine information or a report on global warming is likely
to lead to greater regulation. Based on such a claim it is difficult to see how
a corporation can prove an injury is "actual or imminent" as opposed to
'conjectural' or 'hypothetical . . . ,,t7 As any observer of the regulatory
process knows, predicting whether Congress or an agency will act is a dif-
ficult feat. Predicting that Congress or an agency will act in a manner that
leads to economic injury to a particular company would seem even more
daunting.
In summary, judicial review of information quality complaints may
result in the ossification of information disclosure if agencies are subject to
a constant barrage of such lawsuits. The number of lawsuits that agencies will
have to defend depends on how the courts resolve two key issues. Congress
gave no positive indication in IQA that there was to be judicial review of an
agency's rejection of an information quality complaint, and Congressional
failure to define any of the significant terms of the rider is good evidence that
Congress left the resolution of information quality complaints to the dis-
cretion of agencies subject to OMB's supervision. If, however, a court finds
that the undefined terms of IQA offer law to apply 7' in the resolution of
'n Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
78 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2000).
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lawsuits, the impact of IQA will be determined by the extent to which
plaintiffs can gain standing. It is difficult to make a prediction because the
Supreme Court is not always consistent concerning the degree of proof it
requires to demonstrate that an agency action will lead to an actual injury to
the plaintiff. Assuming that the Court requires evidence that such an injury
is "likely,"' 179 the resolution of standing disputes will be fact-based, with some
plaintiffs obtaining standing and others failing to do so.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ultimate impact of IQA is unknown at this point. Because Congress
failed to define any of the key terms of IQA, hold any hearings, or develop
any other legislative history, it left it for OMB, the agencies, and ultimately
the courts to determine how to balance the agency's substantive mission with
the requirements ofIQA. Congress' failure is particularly unfortunate because
a number of interpretations of IQA will likely ossify the government's efforts
to disclose information and protect the public and the environment. This
result can be avoided, but only if the courts reject interpretations of IQA that
will significantly impede the regulatory mission of EPA and other agencies.
The courts should reject interpretations that ossify information disclosure
because there is no indication in the legislation that Congress meant for it to
have this drastic result.
IQA can serve a useful purpose if the courts ultimately limit it to avoid
the various pitfalls identified in this Article. This satisfactory result, however,
does not mean that Congress acted appropriately in passing IQA. Even if IQA
turns out ultimately to be a good government reform, Congress' failure to
hold hearings and write a clearly-defined statute will lead to costly litigation,
which will have diverted agencies from their regulatory missions. While it
may be true that all is well that ends well, reform by appropriation rider is
hardly the best way to address administrative reform.
'
79 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
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